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Abstract
Developing the purchasing organisation is an ongoing challenge for large contractors where internal and external perspectives need 
to interplay. The aim of this paper is two-fold: firstly, the development of a theoretical framework to characterise the purchasing 
organisation and secondly, to analyse the limited adoption of integrated purchasing through an analysis of barriers to integration. 
The theoretical standpoint is underpinned by purchasing organisation theory and by literature on internal and external integration 
as well as barriers to integration. Based on a two-year case study, the paper presents the status of the purchasing organisation and 
the barriers to further integration as originating from the strategic purchasers of the contractor. The perceived barriers question 
full integration internally and externally. The perceived barriers encompass low framework agreement status compared to orders, 
inconsistent ways of working in the projects and dispersed geographical location and sub-markets. The barriers to integration 
stem from both attitudinal and industrial matters, whilst institutional barriers are not identified. The paper therefore proposes a 
differentiated, requisitely disintegrated, purchasing organisation designed to manage the diverse supplier population. In contrast 
to those advocating a tighter internal and external integration, this paper suggests a requisite balance between integration and 
specialisation of the purchasing activities.
Keywords: purchasing organisation, integration, integration barriers, construction industry
1. Introduction
Organisation of purchasing activities internally and externally 
implies designing functions, tasks, assigning resources and 
management and carrying out interaction with selected and non-
selected suppliers (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). The interplay 
between internal organisational functions in purchasing and the 
external organising towards suppliers, the supplier relations, 
becomes increasingly important as companies tend to decrease 
the in-house activities while striving towards profitability in 
all aspects of their business (Gadde et al., 2010). While some 
authors view internal as well as external integration as a recipe for 
purchasing success (Rozemeijer, 2000, Cousins and Spekman, 
2003, Holmen and Pedersen, 2010), full integration might not be 
a universal solution in all contexts (Gadde and Snehota, 2000, 
Benton and McHenry, 2010). In the context of this paper, internal 
integration concerns the interaction between the purchasing 
department and the projects whereas external integration 
concerns both the purchasing department’s interaction with the 
suppliers as well as the projects’ interaction with the suppliers. 
Supplier relationships can be established through framework 
agreements transcending the mere buying of products. 
The aim of this paper is two-fold. Firstly is development of a 
theoretical framework to characterise the purchasing organisation 
and relations to suppliers and to use this on a case of a large 
contractor. The main dimensions in the characterisation are the 
four organisational dimensions integration, division of tasks, 
coordination and decision scope as well as the external relation 
characterisation. There is a focus on the internal aspects of the 
purchasing organisation and how the internal organisation may 
interplay with the external environment such as with the supply 
chain. Secondly is to analyse the limited adoption of integrated 
purchasing through identifying and analysing integration barriers. 
The particular contribution of this paper is to address the current 
gap in the literature related to interplay between internal and 
external integration and to extend the understanding by arguing 
requisite disintegration as a way forward. The paper is founded 
on a two-year case study with ethnographical elements of one 
of Sweden’s largest contractors and its initiative of a purchasing 
transformation which aimed to centralise 50 per cent of the total 
purchasing volumes.
Contractors purchase material and services for 70-80% of their 
turnover (Axelsson, 2005). Studies have even shown that up to 
90% of a project’s budget might stem from purchased material 
and services (Hinze and Tracey, 1994). Hence, suppliers form 
a large part of the quality that the contractors deliver (Proverbs 
and Holt, 2000, Karim et al., 2006) and in order for contractors 
to increase their competitiveness they need to prioritise the value 
created by the suppliers and realise the suppliers’ part in the 
delivery. Contractors also tend to invest resources to establish 
closer and long-term relationships with their customers while 
they ignore establishing long-term relationships with their 
suppliers (Josephson et al., 2009); a phenomenon transcending 
to the literature on contractor-supplier relationships which has 
gained less attention than the literature on client-contractor 
relationships (Bygballe et al., 2010). A specific gap within 
contractor-supplier literature exists regarding studies of 
longitudinal nature (Bemelmans et al., 2012). 
Within the construction industry, contractors are structured 
as project-based organisations (Hobday, 2000). A construction 
project involves several relationships between firms. Projects that 
initiate new relationships between firms increase the uncertainty 
and the risk. The strong project organisation in construction 
– with its features of fragmentation – enables the delivery of 
geographically specific and contextualised products, mostly 
with influence and specification from a specific client. The 
organising, supply, purchasing and logistics through the project 
are thus part of the delivery of a solution for the services to be 
produced (Vrijhoef and Koskela, 2000). Yet, project organising 
of purchasing produces cost issues and hampers internal and 
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external integration as well as learning beyond the single project 
(Koch and Bendixen, 2005). 
The paper is structured in the following way. First the theoretical 
framework develops based on purchasing organisation literature 
and is reinforced by organisational design literature where focus 
is on integration and integration barriers. Then follows a method 
section and an empirical section based on a two-year participatory 
case study of a large Swedish contractor where first the internal 
purchasing organisation is characterised and then the contractor’s 
external relationships. The paper continues with a discussion of 
which integration barriers that are identified and where in the 
organisation they emerge followed by a differentiation of four 
modes for organising purchasing. Lastly, conclusions are drawn 
arguing for a mediating, requisitely disintegrated purchasing 
organisation which is based on enhanced collaboration between 
the purchasing department and the projects.
2. Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework departs from the purchasing 
literature where organisation of purchasing is discussed through 
the interplay between internal and external integration. The 
theoretical framework is enforced by organisational design 
literature and literature on integration barriers derived from the 
construction industry. Lastly, a summary is presented which 
explicates the key insights from the theoretical framework.
2.1 Organisation of purchasing
A trend within the contractors of the construction industry has 
been to follow the strategic purchasing approaches originally 
developed for the manufacturing industry by centralising the 
purchasing function and organisation and forming framework 
agreements with suppliers in order to reach enhanced efficiency 
(Axelsson et al., 2005). The reported results have, however, varied 
(Koch, 2011). Several authors have discussed how purchasing 
may be organised. Some examples are discussed here. 
One of the extremes concerning purchasing organisation 
is the centralised mode. In this case a purchasing department 
is placed centrally in the company by top management and is 
responsible for purchasing activities such as supplier strategies, 
supplier selection, negotiation and the signing of long-term 
agreements (van Weele, 2005). Operational activities such as 
call-off orders on agreements are done locally but according 
to the agreements signed centrally. The purchasing tasks and 
decisions are hence located at the purchasing department. By 
centralising the purchasing authority to the central functions 
of the organisation, purchasing volumes can be consolidated, 
adherence to purchasing plans and strategies is facilitated 
and purchasing expertise is developed within the purchasing 
department. Additionally, the duplication of purchasing efforts 
may be severely reduced (Monczka et al., 2009). 
Decentralised purchasing organisation is the other extreme. 
In this case the purchasing authority is located locally where 
business units or projects are fully responsible for all purchasing 
activities (van Weele, 2005). All purchasing decisions and tasks 
are performed locally and a central purchasing department is 
therefore not needed. The need for internal vertical integration is 
thus non-existent. A decentralised purchasing organisation may 
result in the same company negotiating with the same supplier 
regarding similar products but may be compensated by the 
potential benefits of being locally embedded. A decentralised 
purchasing organisation gains advantages regarding speed 
and responsiveness to changed demands and conditions, an 
understanding of the operational requirements, but may also 
increase the individuals’ ownership and personal commitment 
through this empowerment (Monczka et al., 2009). 
Few companies are, however, located at these extremes 
(Monczka et al., 2009). Combinations of centralised and 
decentralised purchasing organisations are widespread as 
practical solutions in industries (Fearon and Leenders, 1995). 
One model for choosing a preferred purchasing organisation 
is based on corporate coherence and purchasing maturity and 
is presented by Rozemeijer and Wynstra (2005) drawing on 
the work by Rozemeijer (2000). The corporate coherence is 
related to the extent to which different parts – projects in this 
paper – of the company are operated and managed as one 
entity. Purchasing maturity relates to the professionalism in 
the purchasing function – the purchasing department in this 
paper – regarding e.g., its role and position, the involvement of 
top management in strategic purchasing decisions, the quality 
of the purchasing parties and the level of collaboration with 
suppliers. Based on the two variables, a five mode taxonomy is 
presented: Decentralised, when maturity and coherence is low; 
Federal, when maturity is high and coherence is low; Centre-
led, when maturity and coherence is high; Centralised, when 
maturity is low and coherence is high; and Coordinated, as an 
intermediate mode when both maturity and coherence are in 
the middle. Furthermore, as an organisation’s strategy is to be 
more responsive to individual customers, a more decentralised 
approach would be likely (Monczka et al., 2009). Tailoring the 
purchasing organisation to the current business situation is a 
prerequisite in order to be effective (Rozemeijer and Wynstra, 
2005).
In a study, Koch (2011) finds centralised, decentralised and 
mixed modes when investigating contractors’ purchasing 
organisations. Both the centralised and the decentralised is 
found to be dysfunctional (see also Karjalainen, 2009). One 
specific case study exhibits integration between centralised 
and decentralised elements enabled by committees of project 
members collaborating directly with strategic purchasers. This 
appears to have enabled a high degree of loyalty to the suppliers 
with a framework agreement and Koch (2011) finds exemplary 
triads of projects, suppliers and central purchasing where specific 
collaboration can be realised in a similar way as intended in 
the coordinated mode presented by (Rozemeijer and Wynstra, 
2005).  
Two extremes of purchasing organisation – centralised and 
decentralised – have been identified together with possible 
intermediate modes. To further inform these modes of 
organisation of purchasing, the internal perspectives are further 
elaborated through the concepts of internal integration, decision 
scope, coordination and division of tasks. Afterwards, external 
integration is covered to inform the external perspectives.  
 
2.2 Internal integration and organisational perspectives 
Integration can be defined as “the collaboration required 
achieving unity of effort” (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967 in Hatch 
and Cunliffe, 2006:112). Further Monczka et al. (2009:114) 
views integration as “the process of incorporating or bringing 
together different groups, functions or organisations, either 
formally or informally, physically or by information technology, 
to work jointly and often concurrently on a common business-
related assignment or purpose”. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
found that high performance organisations had the appropriate 
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degree of differentiation for their environment and used forms 
of coordination consistent with the coordination demands of 
their differentiated activities. Whereas Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) argue that the organsiational design is an outcome of 
the environment and inherent culture and structures, this paper 
views the decision of how to organise purchasing as a result of 
strategic choices by the involved actors (Pettigrew, 1985).
Classical organisational design literature would organise 
tasks horizontally in specialised units, integrating similar tasks 
and differentiating tasks into units in order to obtain expertise 
and efficiency (Cummings and Worley, 2005). In other words, 
organisation should strive for the right balance between 
integration and differentiation. The units, carrying out the tasks 
necessary for production of products and services, would then 
be controlled and coordinated by assigned management with an 
appropriate decision scope and using communication channels 
(Mintzberg, 1993, Ensign, 1998). 
Decision scope relates to the actor’s possibility to decide when 
performing a specific function in the purchasing organisation. 
Decisions cover choice of work method, choice of product to 
make, choice of tools (Schumann et al., 1994), and the scope 
can be characterised by the degree to which the actor can do 
so. Coordination between different tasks has been defined as 
including the following mechanisms: mutual adjustment, direct 
supervision standardisation of work processes, standardisation 
of outputs, skills and norms (Mintzberg, 1993). At present the 
construction industry struggles with how to coordinate between 
projects as the projects need a certain autonomy but also need to 
act as part of a company. A classic tool to increase coordination 
is to establish hierarchy. Division of tasks or division of labour 
relates to division of jobs and tasks into groups and subgroups and 
how these are divided between organisational actors (Galbraith, 
1977). Purchasing in construction can actually be understood as 
just such a division of tasks (Vrijhoef and Koskela, 2000). 
The organisational concepts of integration, decision scope, 
coordination and division of tasks can be used to develop 
a typology as reference for the internal part of analysis of 
purchasing organisation. 
2.3 External integration and its interplay with internal 
integration 
By approaching suppliers through external integration, i.e. 
supplier development, just-in-time purchasing and supplier 
partnering, it have been argued that positive effects on 
performance are realised (Van Der Vaart and Van Donk, 2008, 
Droge et al., 2012). The success of external integration is, 
however, associated with good knowledge of the supplier, 
properly aligned roles, and characteristics of the buyer-supplier 
relationship which “may not be achievable within one single 
project but may require a longer term commitment both from 
the contractor and the supplier” (Martinsuo and Ahola, 2010, p. 
109). 
The ways of effectuating inter-organisational interactions 
between buyers and suppliers are, however, multi-faceted. 
Characteristics of the interactions range from arm’s-length, 
transactional relationships where two parties are carrying out 
a transaction isolated in time to obligational, collaborative 
relationships which span an extended time period reaching 
beyond the specific transaction (Anderson and Narus, 1991, 
Sako, 1992). The degree of collaboration is also founded in 
how close the involved parties need to work together in order 
to achieve their individual goals (Cox, 2001). Additionally, 
relationships with suppliers haves been characterised by a 
degree of adversarialism, explaining the amount of conflict that 
will occur over value appropriation (Cox, 2001).
External as well as internal integration has been argued as 
a recipe towards purchasing success within the purchasing 
literature (Rozemeijer, 2000, Cousins and Spekman, 2003, 
Holmen and Pedersen, 2010). Some purchasing authors claim 
that the interplay between internal organisational activity 
structures or functions in purchasing and the external organising 
with suppliers becomes increasingly important (Gadde et al., 
2010). Internal integration has also been viewed as a precursor 
to external integration (Hillebrand and Biemans, 2003, Zhao 
et al., 2011), proposing the importance of the organisation’s 
willingness to integrate with the supply chain in order to 
successfully achieve external integration (Zhao et al., 2011). 
The argument, however, fails to point out which functions of 
the organisation are implied. Moreover, reasoning like this has 
an underpinning assumption that the different functions within 
the organisation act in a similar manner, which in this paper 
has been shown not to be the case. Third, it is an organisational 
view overemphasising mechanical links in the organisation and 
underestimating the importance of the actors’ interaction. Full 
integration is, however, not a universal solution in all contexts 
(Gadde and Snehota, 2000, Benton and McHenry, 2010).
2.4 Barriers to internal and external integration
Developing a new purchasing organisation, doing purchasing 
organising development is here viewed as carrying out 
organisational change, with an external and internal element. In 
principle, barriers to change can originate from a range of factors 
in an organisation, but one frequently pointed at is resistance to 
change by employees, related to their perception of the impact 
of the change (Kotter, 1996). Dent and Goldberg (1999) on the 
other hand would insist in avoiding stereotyping both parties, 
management and employees. 
The notion of perceived barrier is therefore borrowed with 
some caution from an interpretivist change management context 
(Kotter, 1996). An actor’s perception of a barrier derives from 
experience with barriers, gut feeling and exchange of opinions 
with colleagues and other actors or even derived from the 
organisational culture. That barriers exist is here accompanied 
by a contention that that they can be overcome by mobilising 
resources and motivation.
In their discussion of perceived barriers to change in construction 
processes, Vennström and Eriksson (2010) distinguish between 
attitudinal, industrial and institutional barriers to change in 
construction. Attitudinal barriers are understood as adversarial 
attitudes, lack of ethics and morality, focus on projects instead 
of processes and a short-term focus. Industrial barriers are 
understood as traditional organisation of the construction process, 
conservative industry culture, industry structure and traditional 
production processes whereas institutional barriers is defined as 
standard contracts, laws and traditional procurement procedures 
(Vennström and Eriksson, 2010). Their analysis focuses on the 
client’s perceived barriers and they find that attitudinal and 
industrial barriers are important whereas the institutional are not. 
They further emphasise the role of closeness between client and 
contractor as important in the perception of attitudinal barriers. 
However, Vennström and Eriksson (2010) used questionnaires 
to investigate the issue which locked them in to specific and 
perceived barriers - something they fully acknowledge. 
There are also several barriers and constraints in play that 
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undermine the establishment and maintenance of contractor-
supplier relations in construction (Akintoye et al., 2000, 
Dainty et al., 2001). Dainty et al. (2001) argue that “the key 
barriers to greater integration seem to stem from the historical 
fragmentation of project delivery systems and the contractual 
and adversarial nature of construction project relationships”. 
They categorised barriers to subcontractor integration into the 
supply chain and suggested changes required to alleviate each 
barrier. They mention financial/cost-related issues, such as 
competitive tendering, programming/time-related issues, such 
as main contractors not ready for their input during construction, 
quality of information and related issues, such as insufficient 
information given to subcontractors, and attitude-related issues, 
such as main contractors focusing on completing projects in 
time rather than integrating suppliers. Also, forming long-term 
partnerships with a particular main contractor, sub-contractors 
may lose work with others as a consequence (Dainty et al., 
2001). 
When following the categorisation by Vennström and Eriksson 
(2010), barriers which have been mentioned in the literature 
which relate to attitudinal issues are aggressive business mentality 
(Akintoye et al., 2000), low trust economy (Green et al., 2005), 
unique projects that require unique configurations of internal 
and external capabilities (Martinsuo and Ahola, 2010), higher 
interest in client relationships than in supplier relationships (e.g. 
Akintoye et al., 2000, Josephson et al., 2009). Barriers which 
relate to industrial issues are conflicting nature of demand and 
supply (Cox and Ireland, 2002), high degree of uncertainty and 
technical novelty (Martinsuo and Ahola, 2010), fragmented 
sector with many specialist firms (Dainty et al., 2001) and niche 
markets (Green et al., 2005), complicated structures of power 
in the materials, task, equipment and professional services 
marketplaces (Cox and Ireland, 2002), Most of both the attitudinal 
and the industrial barrier tend to be external in their character. 
Another reason for the hesitant approach towards integration 
from the project might be the difficulty for practitioners of 
identifying the benefits of integration and collaboration (Dainty 
et al., 2001). 
While authors have commented on barriers to external 
integration of sub-contractors and material suppliers long-
term, few have discussed the internal integration of the central 
purchasing organisation and the local project purchasing. This 
ought to be an interesting avenue since there is “a significant 
conflict between organisational strategy and its implementation 
at a project level” (Dainty et al., 2001). Furthermore, the 
difficulty for practitioners to identify the benefits of integration 
has been neglected by the contractor-supplier literature which 
rather assumes the approach is beneficial (Bemelmans et al., 
2012).
This discussion on barriers to integration has revealed a 
very open field of possible areas where these might occur and 
what they might relate to. Some tendencies might, however, be 
elucidated. The two major fields in which barriers to integration 
could emerge seem to be within attitudinal and industrial 
matters (Dainty et al., 2001, Vennström and Eriksson, 2010). 
These fields have also been argued to have a larger impact as 
barriers than institutional barriers (Vennström and Eriksson, 
2010). Due to the open field of possible barriers, we have chosen 
to look systematically at the internal and external purchasing 
organisation of the case organisation. Hence, the individuals 
within the purchasing organisations’ perception have guided 
the empirical data, rather than conceptually closing the types of 
possible barriers. 
2.5 Summarising the theoretical framework
Based on the theoretical framework, two extremes of a continuum 
of purchasing organisations are identified, the centralised and 
the decentralised purchasing organisation. Additionally, an 
intermediate mode, hybrid purchasing organisation is glimpsed 
in between. Whether this hybrid mode is one or many varieties 
is, however, still a subject for further investigation. In the view 
of this paper, designing of the purchasing organisation is based in 
the concepts of division of tasks, decision scope and coordination. 
Overarching these concepts and considered the most important 
activity is integration, both internally and externally. In this 
specific context, internal integration concerns the relationship 
between the purchasing department and the projects whereas the 
external integration concerns both the purchasing department’s 
interactions with the suppliers as well as the projects’ interactions 
with the suppliers.
Barriers to integration can, however, stem from a range of 
factors and emerge both from internal and external integration, 
advising us to use an open empirical approach. Yet, attitudinal 
and industrial matters seem to comprise more apparent barriers 
than, for instance, institutional matters. Departing from the 
introduced internal and external concepts, analysis of integration 
barriers within a case organisation will further help untangle 
organisation of purchasing.
3. Method
The paper is based on a qualitative case study which has 
encompassed an in-depth investigation of purchasing within a 
contractor organisation in a real-life context. When initiating the 
study on which this paper is based, the case study organisation 
was going through a purchasing transformation and was about to 
start a development project focusing on supplier development. 
During discussions with Chalmers University of Technology, 
an industrial PhD project was initiated as part of the supplier 
development project. Due to this set-up, in-depth access was 
facilitated to a large Swedish contractor in the forefront regarding 
purchasing.
Over two years, the first author was employed within 
the purchasing department of the contractor. Participatory 
observations together with individual interviews constitute the 
primary method of data collection, which is summarised in Table 
1. The participative observations lasted for a period of two years 
where the first author’s role as an observer was subordinated to 
the role of participant and hence, could be termed participant-
as-observer (Gold, 1958, Merriam, 2009). The observations 
contributed to an increased insight into the case organisation. For 
example, people at the purchasing department have mentioned 
difficulties with the on-going purchasing transformation; this 
was, however, a subject that was mostly discussed around the 
coffee machine rather than in formal venues. 
As the first author was part of the everyday work at the 
purchasing department, there were many opportunities to discuss 
questions and findings with people from the case organisation. A 
primary source of information has been informal conversations 
which have occurred many times every day during the two years. 
The informal conversations have mainly been with the personnel 
at the central purchasing department located at the Gothenburg 
office. Category managers, sourcing specialists, content 
specialists, purchasing group managers, purchasing managers 
and the purchasing director have been recurrent counterparts in 
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these conversations which have occurred during work, during 
coffee breaks, during travels and during after-work activities. 
Three individuals within the purchasing department have 
featured as key informants. These individuals have described 
their work and their challenges in detail on at least a monthly 
basis.  
In addition to the informal conversations, daily operative 
meetings and workshops have contributed to an enforced 
understanding of the organisation and its challenges. Mainly 
two types of formal meeting have been attended. The first type 
related to the group where the first author was formally employed, 
concerning implementation and development of suppliers and 
the group’s support to the category managers. The second type 
concerned the development of tools and methods for supplier 
development related to the project which the first author was 
working within. Even though the topics of all these meetings 
have not been the research project as such, the insights from the 
meetings have given an opportunity to continuously revise and 
reconsider the findings based on discussions with the people in 
the case organisation. Because the participants have interacted 
during these gatherings, valuable insights have been added to 
the data.
In addition to the observations, a total of 37 in-depth interviews 
were conducted. Of these interviews, 25 focused on one specific 
contractor-supplier relationship, where 10 respondents belonged 
to the project management of the contractor and 15 respondents 
to the supplier organisation, (for further analysis see Frödell 
and Josephson, 2008) and 12 of the respondents were strategic 
purchasers working at the purchasing department (for further 
analysis see Frödell, 2011). The interviews were based on open-
ended questions, lasted from 45 to 90 minutes and were mainly 
conducted at the respondent’s office or in an adjacent room. 
Written documentation also contributed to the findings of 
the study. These documents mainly provided background 
information but provided information unbiased by personnel and 
respondents’ personal opinions and perceptions. Annual reports, 
purchasing statistics from the case organisation, framework 
agreements, role descriptions and excerpts from the quality 
systems describing preferred ways of working are examples 
of documents used. Also proposals and decisions regarding the 
purchasing transformation helped in developing a grounded 
understanding of the management framing. 
The iterative analysis in this study has been conducted through 
matching of the empirical data and the theoretical framework 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Integration barriers and in particular 
perceived barriers have been extracted and formulated and also 
re-directed the study through a need to extend the collected data 
and provided possibilities for further analysis. The production of 
knowledge behind this article has thus occurred in an abductive 
manner where empirical fieldwork and analytical work have 
interacted with the simultaneous evolving of the theoretical 
framework (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). The iterative analysis has 
been performed by the first and second author in a manner that 
the first author has re-told on a recurrent basis during the two 
year case study and summarised the insights and findings from 
the collected data. While some of the perceived barriers have 
been based on the overall impressions and observations, some of 
them have also been extracted from documents. 
Based on the data from the case organisation, categories and 
themes of integration barriers have emerged and been matched 
to theoretical concepts and the theoretical framework through 
analysis, comparison and mapping (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). 
As part of the analysis, preliminary findings and categorisations 
have been presented and discussed with key informants 
during an audio-recorded three hour workshop. In addition to 
a restructuring of the perceived barriers, the workshop added 
further details into the areas which the perceived barriers relate 
to. By discussing the integration barriers between the authors, a 
final categorisation was formed.
Due to the participatory nature of the study, a reflexive and 
critical stance has been maintained during the study in order to 
mitigate bias. There may, however, be implications of this type 
of participatory study due to the researcher going native in the 
case organisation. Since this study reports on the perceptions 
of the individuals within the case organisation, this would, 
however, be considered a strength rather than a drawback due 
to the in-depth access to both organisation and personnel. To 
further mitigate bias, the first author distanced himself from the 
case organisation during the latter part of the analysis and the 
writing of this paper. The findings and results have also been 
Type of method Details
Observations 2 years participatory observations within central purchasing department, 2007-2009
Informal conversations Several informal conversations daily with category managers, sourcing specialists, content special-
ists, purchasing group managers, purchasing managers and the purchasing director
Three individuals featured as key informants
Formal meetings Meetings as part of the everyday work within supply management specialists group
Meetings as part of the everyday work within the supplier development project
Annual two-day seminars with central purchasing department
Interviews 37 interviews; 45-90 minutes per interview
Contractor: 8 category managers; 4 purchasing group managers; 8 site managers; 2 foremen
Supplier: 7 business managers; 4 sales representatives; 2 key account managers; 2 service and 
logistic staff
Other group activities Feedback seminars with internal reference group
Feedback seminars with external reference group
Other data sources Annual reports, purchasing statistics for the internal database, framework agreements, decision of 
the purchasing transformation, website
Table 1. Summary of data collection
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continuously discussed with fellow researchers and between the 
authors in order to maintain a critical distance from the studied 
organisation. The aim of this paper is, however, not to give an 
exhaustive coverage of barriers related to the establishment and 
maintenance of contractor-supplier relationships, but to report 
topics which were frequently mentioned and discussed within 
the case organisation.
4. Case
The case description below presents the purchasing organisation 
in an internal and external perspective. Each perspective then 
develops the role of barriers for more integrated purchasing. 
The barriers are based mostly on the perception of the strategic 
purchasers within the purchasing department. While the actors 
visible in the analysis are the purchasing department, supplier 
representatives and project representatives, the perceived barriers 
mainly circulate around the interrelations between these actors 
but also transcend to top management. Below, the description of 
the purchasing organisation follow a top down view beginning 
with top management, followed by the purchasing department 
and the project organisation.
4.1 The contractor’s internal purchasing organisation
The case company is one of Sweden’s largest contractors and 
part of an international group. With a turnover of 23.2 BSEK 
and 9,400 employees during 2010, the company is active in 
civil engineering and building and is involved in thousands of 
projects each year located all over Sweden. 
The vision of the top management is to become a role model 
in Swedish industry while the business concept states that 
the organisation develops, builds and maintains the physical 
environment for living, travelling and working. Following a 
top management decision, purchasing became an explicit part 
of the corporate strategy in 2005. A proposal initiated by two 
vice presidents and developed by the appointed purchasing 
management became the basis for a new organisation of 
purchasing – the purchasing transformation – and was decided 
in the top management of the contractor later the same year. 
The former purchasing department got increased attention 
as a national organisational unit where the vice president of 
purchasing became part of the top management team. 
Historically, purchasing has been a decentralised activity with 
the full responsibility given to each project. In an internal survey, 
almost 25 per cent of the employees specified that purchasing 
was part of their work. Each individual working with purchasing 
within the projects depended on their own network of suppliers, 
using the one they found most attractive or suitable. As a result, 
purchasing within the case organisation was very fragmented, 
not only in terms of the many different suppliers used, but also 
in terms of those suppliers treating buyers from each individual 
project separately. In turn, many suppliers have been missing the 
picture of the company as one customer. 
The purchasing transformation had the ambition to centralise 
the purchasing function and make purchasing a specialised 
strategic function instead of an operational project-based 
activity. The transformation aimed at centralising 50 per cent of 
the purchasing volumes through global and national framework 
agreements whilst still keeping 50 per cent within the projects. 
A task force consisting of the purchasing management and 
representatives from top management decided what to centralise 
and what to keep decentralised. In addition to consolidating 
volumes and renegotiating prices from suppliers, the initiative 
included development projects concerning logistics, separation 
of material and services when procuring subcontractors and 
later also supplier development. Also, e-procurement systems 
were being implemented and standardisations of some of the 
framework agreement suppliers’ available product range were 
being made within these systems. The initiative was executed 
to fully utilise the potential benefits that the company could 
gain from being one of Sweden’s major internationally active 
companies and thereby reduce the purchasing costs. 
As part of the purchasing transformation, the purchasing 
department grew from 30 to approximately 120 employees during 
the years 2006-2008. In order to ensure high quality knowledge 
in purchasing, many of the newly recruited were formerly 
purchasing experts at major companies in other industries such 
as pharmaceuticals and automotive. The external recruitment 
was argued as a stepping stone to surmount the lack of strategic 
purchasing knowledge within the construction industry as well 
as to bring established purchasing tools and methods for supplier 
management to the company through the experienced employees. 
While being a national unit, most of the people employed within 
the central purchasing departments were geographically located 
in either Stockholm or Gothenburg. 
The purchasing department is centred on category managers 
who are responsible for framework agreements with suppliers. 
The category managers are responsible for sourcing and 
management of the supplier base in one or more purchasing 
categories. The category managers themselves do no actual 
buying, but represent the suppliers’ formal contacts with the 
central purchasing department. A handful of category managers 
related to either material or services categories constitute a 
purchasing group, which is managed by a purchasing group 
manager. A total of 12 purchasing groups exist in the purchasing 
department covering, for instance, civil engineering materials, 
framework supplemental material and indirect materials and 
services. The purchasing group manager coordinates the group 
and is responsible for fulfilment of its goals and objectives, 
as well as being responsible as category manager for one or 
two categories. In addition, three functions in the purchasing 
department act as specialists supporting the category managers 
with sourcing, e-procurement systems and providing advice on 
international matters. Also, the development project concerning 
logistics acted as support to the category managers when 
sorting the logistic matters related to the framework agreement 
suppliers.
Since Sweden is a long country with a long distance from 
north to south and the contractor does business in a variety of 
sub-industries, the contractor exhibits a geographically divided 
organisation into several regions and further into several districts. 
Derived from the regions or the districts, project organisations are 
formed to perform a specific project. The operative purchasing 
is executed by each specific project. The projects vary both in 
characteristics covering civil engineering, residential and non-
residential buildings, but there is also a wide variety in size. Of 
the 2000 projects over 1 MSEK executed in a specific year, 24 
projects over 100 MSEK were executed covering 30 per cent of 
the project portfolio. Additionally, 102 projects between 99 and 
25 MSEK covered 26 per cent, 254 projects between 24 and 10 
MSEK covered 21 per cent and 1,187 projects between 1 and 10 
MSEK covered 23 per cent of the project portfolio. Based on the 
size of the project, the project organisation is formed. 
The project management is centred on a site manager. 
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The site manager is supported by foremen who have the 
operational responsibility of subcontractors and employees. 
The financial responsibility for the project is placed on the site 
manager, including the financial responsibility for purchasing. 
A project engineer may support the site manager in areas such 
as purchasing. A regional or district purchaser might also be 
involved during high volume purchases. The site manager 
reports to a project manager who in turn reports to the district, or 
to the region depending on size of the project, and within which 
region the project is situated. In smaller projects, however, the 
project management might be constituted of one individual who 
covers all responsibilities, whereas in larger projects several site 
managers might share the responsibility of the project divided 
into sections or type of work. 
An inherent part of the organisational structure is the local 
decision-making and the project-oriented focus on profit. Even 
though the purchasing department signs framework agreements 
with suppliers, the projects make the decision of what suppliers 
to use. A strategic purchaser emphasised the subordinate status 
of the framework agreement and the power of the order itself 
by stating that “The framework agreements may be good for 
our suppliers but in the end it is the actual order that matters. 
A non-binding agreement is more a case of nice to have.” An 
observed effect of this is that the framework agreements are 
mainly being used when considered the most favourable from 
a project perspective compared to the spot market. From a 
supplier perspective, this fosters a need to market their products 
twice, once to the purchasing organisation for the signing of 
the agreement and once to the projects for the actual order. 
The supplier thus builds relations with both the purchasing 
department and the projects.
Additionally, observations were made through the organisation 
that suppliers differentiate their pricing for the projects. A 
strategic purchaser pointed out that “there are sub-contractors 
that offer a certain price if a specific site manager is responsible 
for the project”, and argued that the reason for this was that 
the suppliers know that it will be a better functioning process. 
The reason was the wide variety of ways of working within the 
projects.
Following the initial focus of the purchasing organisation 
which was signing agreements with suppliers and lowering 
prices, awareness starts to take form that this is only one part 
of the equation for lowered purchasing costs. Equally important 
is the usage of the agreements, the agreement compliance. 
Consequently, the main focus turns towards marketing the 
benefits of the agreements to the projects in order for them 
to utilise the signed framework agreements. The purchasing 
department, hence, takes an additional role as a marketing 
department where all strategic purchasers are offered training 
within marketing and also processes and templates for marketing 
material were developed; a change of focus unforeseen by most 
of the strategic purchasers. Due to this shift towards a dual 
focus on purchasing and marketing, the subordinate status of the 
framework agreements became even more apparent.
Despite the contractor’s initiatives on standardised ordering 
for the projects such as e-procurement solutions, the ways of 
working within the projects varies and relates both to the variety 
in tasks and to the specific site manager; less to the company 
structures or management, which the site manager is a part of. 
Hence, when the supplier is approaching the projects there are 
different ways in how the projects think the ordering and delivery 
should be conducted, making the situation for the supplier very 
difficult, e.g. regarding times for delivery and routines for 
receiving the goods or services but also regarding planning and 
effectuation of subcontracting. A reason for maintaining the 
personalised ways of working may be related to the project-
oriented focus on profit.
In addition to the short-term, project-based incentive systems 
within the projects, the purchasing department’s incentives also 
follow a short-term strategy. After an event where the purchasing 
department was gathered and several strategic purchasers were 
being awarded by the purchasing management and honoured 
for new framework agreements with high price reductions, 
one of the strategic purchasers argued – off the record – that 
he could have signed a better deal with the suppliers. Since 
the evaluations of the purchasers and the incentive structures 
were based on reducing prices each year, however, the strategic 
purchaser chose to sign a one-year agreement in order to be 
able to reduce prices again next year. The internal performance 
measurements and incentives systems, consequently, drive the 
organisation’s members to take a short-term perspective when it 
comes to supplier relations on behalf of long-term perspectives. 
That the measures and incentives systems encourage decreased 
prices each year could be seen as reflecting the concurrent 
economic crisis but also as an indicator of the contractor’s 
short-term orientation. The incentives systems indicate what the 
management sees as important and which criteria they wish to 
aim towards.
4.2 The contractor’s external relationships
Regarding the contractor’s external relationships, a total 
amount of 28,000 suppliers were used by the contractor’s 
organisation during 2007 with varying spend. Purchased 
material and services represented 71,5 precent of the turnover. 
90 per cent of the total spend is concentrated on 10.3 per cent of 
the suppliers and 50 per cent of the total spend is concentrated 
on 0.8 per cent of the suppliers, which equals 227 suppliers. 
Furthermore, 17,500 of the suppliers have invoiced the case 
organisation five or fewer times, of which 9,000 only sent one 
invoice. Of the total purchased volume, 30 per cent were carried 
out through the approximately 600 suppliers who had signed a 
framework agreement with the case company. Even though the 
top management’s aim concerning these framework agreements 
is that they should be used one hundred per cent by the projects, 
their use is not compulsory. 
When further looking at the case organisation’s fifteen largest 
suppliers, framework and non-framework agreed suppliers, it 
becomes evident that the majority of these suppliers deliver less 
than ten per cent of their turnover to the contractor, as shown in 
Table 2. The table presents the case organisation’s purchasing 
from a specific supplier as part of the suppliers’ turnover. If 
the supplying organisation is international, the numbers show 
the turnover of the Swedish subsidiary. The table also shows 
the suppliers’ respective share of the case organisation’s total 
purchasing. With this relatively small impact on the suppliers 
it could be questioned whether the suppliers are interested in 
further integration with the specific contractor. A customer 
could, however, be important for the supplier even though their 
financial impact might be minor.
The case company is a national-based subsidiary of a global 
company, doing business in all regions within Sweden. There 
are, however, few suppliers that are active within similar range 
of markets. The vast majority of suppliers are local, especially 
service suppliers – subcontractors. Within HVAC installation, 
for instance, which is one of the major subsectors there are 
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approximately 3000 firms are registered in Sweden. Only three 
of them operate nationally. A few other firms operate in several, 
but not all, regions. All other firms operate locally. This situation 
is similar in most subsectors. 
If the criterion for choosing suppliers was based on the fact 
that they do business on the same geographical markets as the 
contractor, only a very few firms in every subsector would be 
qualified. Such a limited number would reduce the possibilities 
for finding the supplier that is most suitable for further integration. 
When it comes to specialist contractors, for instance HVAC 
installation firms, it should be noted that they are decentralised 
in a similar way as large contractors.
On a national level, the construction industry is also 
characterised by major market changes over time. The changes 
on a regional level are even greater. When looking at the effects 
of the great market changes, neither the contractor nor its 
suppliers seem to be interested in prioritising a single supplier or 
contractor. A strategic purchaser mentioned how the contractor, 
in times of prosperity, had to buy a certain product from all 
suppliers active in the Gothenburg region. In contrast, when 
the market fell in 2008/2009, the top management gave strong 
recommendations to the suppliers to reduce prices in order to 
maintain their framework agreements. Furthermore, during the 
recession, project managers themselves negotiated with suppliers 
that the contractor already had existing framework agreements 
with in order to get lower prices than those already accepted by 
both parts. 
Furthermore, several examples during the study illustrate 
the strategic purchasers’ diminished influence on what is to be 
bought. Since the possible range of alterations in the products 
is narrowed down by prerequisites and prescriptions on what is 
actually needed for a satisfactory functionality, the bargaining 
power decreases. The client prescribes specific material 
produced by a specific supplier and according to the supplier’s 
product range. A strategic purchaser stated that “We need a 
functional specification instead of just a brand and a model”, 
and emphasised that many alternatives to the well-known and 
sometimes preferred brand might be as good and might also 
come at a lower cost. 
Instead, as an effect of the client’s prescriptions, the contractor 
has to purchase from the suppliers’ ordinary product range rather 
than specifying for the supplier what is actually needed. This 
issue affects the possibilities of recurrent usage of specific 
suppliers since it restricts possibilities for the contractor to 
choose the supplier. “This could be changed if we want to”, one 
strategic purchaser stated, and primarily addressed the projects 
which are developed in-house by the internal client organisation. 
Apparently, even within the internal organisation, the situation 
is perceived and the decisions on products and suppliers are 
thus shifted towards the client organisation from the purchasing 
department.
5. Analysis and discussion
Based on the theoretical framework and the findings of the case 
study, the discussion aims to analyse the limited adoption of 
integrated purchasing by focusing on barriers hindering internal 
and external integration. Lastly, based on the characteristics of 
the purchasing organisation and relations to suppliers, requisite 
disintegration of purchasing through a mediating purchasing 
organisation is discussed as a means to overcome the perceived 
barriers to integration.
5.1 Which integration barriers are identified and where 
do they emerge?
The characteristics of the contractor’s purchasing organisation 
are complex. Drawing on the case study, six perceived barriers 
may be identified; two which are drawn from the contractor’s 
internal organisation, two which are derived from the external 
relationships and two which are derived from the interplay 
between the internal and external organisation. The internal 
perceived barriers to integration are (1) the framework agreements 
subordinate status compared to the purchasing orders and (2) the 
short-term incentive systems for the strategic purchasers within 
the central purchasing function. The two perceived barriers 
that are a mixture of internal and external barriers are (3) the 
inconsistent ways of working within the projects and the related 
Supplier Purchasing volume as share 
of supplier’s turnover
Supplier’s share of contrac-
tor’s total purchases
Internal wholesaler 99% 2.4%
Internal service supplier 84% 2.3%
Material supplier 49% 1.3%
Internal service supplier 4% 1.2%
Material supplier 1% 1.2%
Wholesaler 3% 1.1%
Material supplier 9% 0.8%
Service supplier 5% 0.8%
Wholesaler 4% 0.8%
Internal service supplier 38% 0.8%
Material supplier 20% 0.7%
Internal service supplier 45% 0.7%
Service supplier 2% 0.7%
Material supplier 6% 0.7%
Wholesaler 1% 0.6%
Table 2. The case organisation’s 15 largest suppliers 
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difficulties for suppliers to develop their ways of working and (4) 
the central purchasing department’s diminished influence on the 
procured products derived from clients’ demands. The external 
perceived barriers to integration relate to (5) the interpretation 
of the geographical conditions where the contractor is a national 
actor, but many of the suppliers act on a local market and (6) the 
interpretation of the market changes over time, which affects the 
contractor’s consistency towards the suppliers. 
Barriers to integration, both externally and internally, might 
reflect on the organisation regarding attitudinal and industrial 
matters, but also institutional (Dainty et al., 2001, Vennström 
and Eriksson, 2010). Barriers 1, 2, 3 and 6 relate to the attitudes 
of the involved actors. That framework agreements receive a 
subordinate status compared to purchasing orders stems from the 
project focus within the contractor’s organisation and the short-
term project focus. Likewise, the inconsistency in the ways of 
working within the projects, as well as the contractor's behaviour 
in exploiting the market changes by forcing suppliers to reduce 
prices, both relate to the adversarial attitudes. Hence, the internal 
barriers to integrations both relate to attitudes as do one of each 
of the external and the mixed barriers. Barriers 4 and 5, on the 
other hand, relate to industrial matters. While the purchasing 
department’s diminishing influence on the procured products 
reflects the traditional production process where a large part 
of the decisions related to the product specifications is already 
prescribed, the geographical conditions reflect the traditional 
production processes where the majority of the man hours are 
subcontracted. Industrial barriers are thus, related to one of each 
of the external and mixed barriers. Consequently, the barriers to 
integration identified in the case organisation mainly relate to 
perceived attitudinal and industrial matters. The findings further 
reinforce the conclusions by Vennström and Eriksson (2010) that 
institutional barriers play a minor role as barriers to integration. 
The absence of institutional barriers may further be due to the 
case organisation being a privately owned company and, hence, 
not acting under the regulations of public procurement.
When further analysing the six perceived barriers to integration, 
six interactions have been identified in which they emerge, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The perceived barriers to integration 
serve as a foundation for understanding the actual and perceived 
internal distance between purchasing and projects and the inherent 
implications. Barriers such as incentive rewarding of strategic 
purchasers are based on how much framework agreement prices 
are lowered each year, while site managers are rewarded based 
on the financial result in the specific project; a conflict between 
short-term and long-term intentions towards suppliers. Since 
different approaches and strategies towards suppliers are used 
by purchasing and the projects, difficulties in acting externally in 
an integrated manner become prevalent. A perceived barrier such 
as the subordinate status of the agreements compared to orders 
not only relates to the relationships between the purchasing 
department and the supplier, and between the projects and the 
supplier, it is also derived from the relationship between the top 
management and the purchasing department and the projects, 
respectively.
Moreover, the inconsistent but appropriated ways of working 
across the organisation’s projects challenge the external 
integration and its possible benefits since suppliers need to adapt 
their processes to a vast number of projects. In the same vein, 
the geographical and market fluctuation issues trigger further 
adaption. Additionally, it can be mentioned that the perceived 
uneven distribution of power between the contractor and its 
largest suppliers occurs to the benefit of the large suppliers. 
The contractor only constitutes a very small part of their total 
revenues, making it questionable whether the suppliers are 
interested in making the large efforts required to achieve external 
integration through tightened contractor-supplier relations. 
Based on where the six perceived integration barriers emerge 
within the purchasing organisation and the organisational 
functions between which these interactions are active, a 
foundation for a theoretical framework might be built. Since 
these organisational functions play an important role in the 
existence and non-existence of these barriers, they are all to be 
included in an analysis of the purchasing organisation. Following 
the argument by Dent and Goldberg (1999) on not stereotyping 
top management and employees, organisational functions with 
different specified tasks are clearly separated; as are suppliers 
with and without framework agreements. The separation between 
framework and non-framework agreement suppliers is based in 
the implied division of tasks where the purchasing process of 
non-framework agreements is to be managed by the projects, 
whereas framework agreements are implied as being managed 
by the purchasing department where the projects merely call 
off orders on existing agreements. The company coherence as 
Figure 1. Interactions where barriers to integration are perceived
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discussed by Rozemeijer and Wynstra (2005) would in this case 
relate to the coherence and consistency within and between 
the projects in terms of project management-related ways of 
performing tasks.
5.2 Four modes of organising purchasing
Based in the interactions where integration barriers have been 
identified and drawing on the introduced organisational concepts, 
this paper argues the existence of four modes of organising 
purchasing. These modes are inspired by Fearon and Leenders 
(1995), Rozemeijer and Wynstra (2005) and Koch (2011), and 
supplemented by the case study presented in this paper. The 
four modes are presented in Table 3 and reflect a different 
emphasis on the five organisational functions: top management, 
the purchasing department, the projects, the preferred suppliers 
(those who have framework agreements) and suppliers (without 
framework agreements). While the centralised and decentralised 
act as extremes regarding the degree of integration within the 
purchasing organisation, the intermediate modes characterise 
two modes where the parallel mode draws towards disintegration 
and the mediating mode draws towards integration. The 
parallel mode follows the identified characteristics of the case 
organisation whereas the mediating mode reflects a possible way 
forward for the organisation. Rather than striving for full internal 
and external integration, the mediated model encompasses a 
certain disintegration as the projects’ involvement in purchasing 
is still important but in collaboration with the central purchasing 
department; hence, with a requisite level of disintegration.
Within the parallel mode, the findings show that top 
management is unclear with regards the purchasing department 
and the projects concerning the decision scope and the division 
of tasks, such as signing framework agreements and issuing 
purchasing orders. This creates diffusion between the purchasing 
department and the projects where the decisions concerning 
purchasing are to be taken. Through making it legitimate for 
projects to choose suppliers and issue orders regardless of the 
framework agreements, the top management itself diminishes 
the status and the decision power of the agreements as well as the 
purchasing department. Due to this ambiguity, the coordination 
between the projects and the purchasing department becomes 
absent and the framework agreement suppliers risk getting lost 
in a negative triangle between the central purchasing department, 
project purchasers and themselves. The barriers to integration 
thus drive the suppliers to form bi-dyadic relationships with 
the contractor organisation where one dyad reaches for the 
purchasing department, and the other towards the projects. 
Aligned with propositions by Hillebrand and Biemans (2003), 
the study further shows that a lack of internal integration 
negatively affects the possibilities for external integration 
with suppliers because it produces behaviours that impede 
supplier involvement. While successful examples of similar 
transformations have been reported from other industries and 
other companies (e.g. Bocconcelli and Håkansson, 2008), the 
decentralised and project-based organisation of the case company 
implies integration barriers which impede the transformation 
of purchasing towards a specialised strategic function. A range 
of perceived barriers motivate purchasing actors throughout 
the organisation to follow other paths and logics than the one 
strived for in the strategic purchasing policy. As internal matters 
related to attitudes within the organisation acted as barriers for 
the purchasing transformation, the external integration through 
long-term supplier relationships and supplier development got 
hampered; the shift within the purchasing department’s focus 
from purchasing towards marketing the framework agreements 
to the projects being an illustrative example. Since lack of 
coordination implies that projects do not support initiated 
purchasing initiatives, the few willing and committed suppliers 
are risking a bi-dyadic relationship towards the contractor. A 
relationship which could have been triadic if the collaboration 
and integration between the projects and the purchasing 
department would have been apparent.
 Inspired by examples presented in earlier case studies 
(Koch, 2011), increased coordination between the purchasing 
department and the projects enables a further integrated mode of 
purchasing, a mediating mode. Increased internal coordination is 
shown to facilitate the dispersion of bi-dyadic interactions from 
suppliers towards the purchasing department and the projects 
and enables creation of triadic interactions where the localised 
embeddedness of the projects intertwines with the central 
purchasing synergies. In this mediating mode, the projects 
collaborate with the purchasing department and the purchasing 
department collaborates with the projects regarding framework 
agreement suppliers. The collaboration is, moreover, founded in 
systematic support from the top management regarding decision 
scope and division of tasks, leading to a lower level of ambiguity. 
Centralised Mediating Parallel Decentralised
Top management Systematic commitment 
in purchasing and unam-
biguous decision scope 
and division of tasks
Systematic commitment 
in purchasing and less 
ambiguous decision 
scope and division of 
tasks
Vague commitment in 
purchasing and ambigu-
ity in decision scope and 
division of tasks
Full delegation (empow-
erment) of purchasing to 
projects
Purchasing department Authorised decision 
scope and resources
Collaborating with 
projects
Parallels with projects Non-existing or periph-
eral involvement
Projects Subordinate to purchas-
ing department regarding 
preferred suppliers
Projects collaborate with 
purchasing department
Parallels with purchasing 
department
Authorised decision 
scope and resources 
regarding purchasing
Preferred suppliers 
with framework agree-
ments
Agreement with central 
purchasing department
Triads active with 
projects and purchasing 
departments
Bi-dyads are created to 
projects and purchasing 
department
Project preferences
Suppliers Market relationship with 
projects 
Market relationship with 
projects
Market relationship with 
projects
Market relationship with 
projects
Table 3. Four modes of contractors’ purchasing organisations
The IMP Journal     Volume 7. Issue 1, 2013       56
A clearly stated policy assigns the management of non-framework 
agreements to the projects whereas the framework agreement 
suppliers are formed in tight internal collaboration. 
While the strategic purchasers in the case organisation share 
an understanding that a more integrated and comprehensive 
purchasing policy and activity would be an attractive goal, site 
managers see procurement of suppliers and negotiation of prices 
as two decisive activities in order to influence the success of the 
projects. One reason for the hesitant approach towards integration 
from the projects might be the difficulty to identifying the benefits 
of integration and collaboration (Dainty et al., 2001). In order to 
obtain this internal integration  a change alliance would need 
to be built involving mobilisation of resources and motivation 
for internal integration from the entire organisation (Zhao et al., 
2011). Perceived barriers such as the performance measurement 
and personal incentives would need to be changed through a 
more comprehensive incentive policy and practice along with a 
systematic top level engagement. Yet, full integration does not 
seem to fit the case organisation and its members either internally 
or externally. It appears to be a more adapted goal to accept 
some disintegration in the purchasing policy and organisation to 
balance framework agreements and other purchasing, meet the 
variety of projects, local conditions and the fluctuating market 
which are all difficult barriers to overcome.
6. Conclusions
The aim of this paper is two-fold, wherein it firstly aims 
at developing a theoretical framework to characterise the 
purchasing organisation and relations to suppliers and to use this 
in the case of a large contractor, and secondly, to analyse the 
limited adoption of integrated purchasing through identifying 
and analysing integration barriers. 
The purchasing organisation has been characterised through 
its division of tasks, showing how top level management had a 
vague commitment resulting in ambiguity within the decision 
scope as well as tasks for the central purchasing department and 
the projects. The projects and the purchasing department worked 
in parallel with little coordination and the central purchasing 
department experienced a weakened status in framework 
agreements. The suppliers operated in dyads with the projects and 
framework suppliers finding themselves in a bi-dyadic position 
cooperating with both the projects and the central purchasing 
department. 
Six perceived integration barriers were identified as being 
equally spread over internal, external and a mixture between 
internal and external. The internal perceived barriers to 
integration were first the framework agreements’ subordinate 
status compared to the purchasing orders, and second, 
contradictory incentive systems for the strategic purchasers and 
projects. The two perceived mixed barriers were the inconsistent 
ways of working within the projects and the related difficulties 
for suppliers in developing their ways of working, and the 
central purchasing departments’ diminished influence on the 
procured products derived from clients’ demands. The external 
perceived barriers to integration relate to the interpretation of the 
geographical conditions where the contractor is a national actor, 
though many of the suppliers act on a local market, and second, 
the interpretation of the market changes over time, which affects 
the contractor’s consistency towards the suppliers. The barriers 
to integration stem from both attitudinal and industrial matters, 
whilst institutional barriers are not identified.
A supplier base belonging to the contractor and consisting of 
over 28,000 suppliers where the characteristics of purchased 
products range widely and where a found difference in suppliers’ 
presence on local and regional markets in Sweden is apparent, 
calls for a differentiated approach towards suppliers. Purchasing 
approaches and relationship management choices would vary 
for national material suppliers and local subcontractors, both 
concerning coherence with individual goals and levels of 
adversarialism. It is hardly instrumental to insist on common 
national agreements when local players will be more attractive 
partners in some regions. Full external integration may therefore 
not be the generic cure when discussing external relations. 
Accepting the requisite spread of purchasing organisation in 
different areas of business could even support interpersonal 
relations amongst suppliers, project management and strategic 
purchasing. 
As important element is that the pattern of perceived barriers 
will possibly lead to a differentiated pattern of options for 
establishing triads between project management, strategic 
purchasers and preferred suppliers. The movement towards an 
integrated mode of purchasing organisation is argued for instead 
of the current situation where the purchasing department parallels 
the projects in regard to external relations. Striving too far 
towards a centralised, full integration approach would, however, 
imply a risk of losing local knowledge and embeddedness 
and does not fit with the argued low corporate coherence and 
ambiguous purchasing maturity. 
Consequently, a mediating, requisitely disintegrated purchasing 
organisation is argued which is based on enhanced collaboration 
between purchasing and projects facilitating and promoting 
triads between purchasing, project and suppliers. A mediating 
purchasing organisation would develop the existing bi-dyads 
into triads benefiting from the local contingency of the projects 
as well as the strategic benefits of the purchasing department. 
For this to be reality, top management would, however, need 
to be sincerely committed and unambiguous regarding division 
of tasks and decision scope in order to foster the organisation’s 
possibilities for further integration. 
After the study was finished, the contractor again reorganised 
its purchasing organisation. The reorganisation implied that the 
centralised purchasing department responsible for the framework 
agreements drastically decreased in size. An increased focus 
was put on supporting the projects with the implementation of 
the agreements. The move towards requisite disintegration was 
therefore adopted by the organisation. The effects and results of 
the reorganisation would make an interesting avenue for further 
research. Also, the findings of the paper call for further research 
investigating how integration between purchasing and projects 
might be facilitated within project-based organisations with a 
decentralised tradition.
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